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Abstract 
In their book ‗Uncertainty and Quality of Science for Policy‘ (1990), Funtowicz and 
Ravetz argued the need to extend traditional methods and techniques of quality 
assurance in policy-related science. Since then, these ideas have been operationalized 
further and applied. Particularly relevant have been the recourse to extended peer 
review – to be intended as internal, across disciplines, as well as external, between 
practitioners and stakeholders, and the use of a new approach to qualify quantities: 
NUSAP (Numeral, Unit, Spread, Assessment, Pedigree). Here we describe how 
sensitivity analysis, mandated by existing guidelines as a good practice to use in 
conjunction to mathematical modelling, needs to be transformed and adapted to 
ensure quality in the treatment of uncertainty of science for policy. We thus provide 
seven rules to extend the use of sensitivity analysis (or how to apportion uncertainty 
in model based inference among input factors) in a process of sensitivity auditing of 
models used in a policy context. Each rule will be illustrated by examples.    
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we argue that the quality assessment of mathematical or simulation 
models that underpin current policy making requires a process which transcends the 
mere assessment of the model uncertainties and parametric sensitivities (sensitivity 
analysis) up to include a practice of organized scepticism toward the inference 
provided by mathematical models (sensitivity auditing). Sensitivity tools need to be 
adopted which ensure a complete exploration of the space of the input uncertainties, 
but at the same the boundaries of such a space need to be questioned, if need be also 
by a process of extended peer review cutting across disciplines as well as across the 
fence separating practitioners from stakeholders. Sensitivity auditing also needs to 
cope with non-quantifiable uncertainties, eschewing the hubris of quantification at all 
cost.    
 
We consider this upgrade of sensitivity analysis as necessary and urgent. On one hand 
one sees example of instrumental use of mathematical modelling – more to obfuscate 
that to illustrate, as was the case for the use of Latin by the elites in the classic age 
(hence the quote in our title). On the other hand as practitioners we are puzzled to see 
that even when an appraisal of model sensitivities is attempted by modellers, this is 
often of poor or perfunctory quality (Saltelli and d‘Hombres, 2010, Saltelli and 
Annoni, 2010). In this sense our works feeds into that current of thought which takes 
issue at the poor quality of existing modelling practices (Taleb, 2007, are Pilkey & 
Pilkey, 2007, Savage, 2009). 
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We suggest that through a purposeful organized critical appraisal of model quality 
that we call ―sensitivity auditing‖, scientific models can better fit the purpose of 
informing and justifying policy making proposals, in other words make these models 
more plausible as far their assumptions, outcomes and usage are concerned. In this 
paper we argue that the focus of such exercise is beyond the model itself but 
encompasses the entire modelling process. ―Sensitivity Auditing‖ borrows ideas and 
strategies from sensitivity analysis proper, from post-normal science and from the 
NUSAP system; it is presented as a set of rules which not only address the pitfalls of 
the mathematics in the models but also looks into the process of the auditing, in other 
words not only what to look for but how to look for and who should look for.  
 
So, we start by providing some background of the intellectual context in which we 
move; we then present what could be seen as a continuous process of ―vigilance‖ that 
we call sensitivity auditing; we discuss what rules this process should have, including 
the process by which it could be implemented, and finally we link this endeavour to 
the central concept of this special issue: plausibility. 
 
2. Post Normal Science 
In their book ‗Uncertainty and Quality of Science for Policy‘ (1990), Funtowicz and 
Ravetz developed new conceptual and practical tools for coping with uncertainty and 
the assurance of quality of quantitative information in policy-related research. 
Complementing this effort, Funtowicz and Ravetz (199x) also introduced a novel 
mode of scientific problem-solving appropriate to policy issues where facts are 
uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent. They called it Post 
Normal Science, to relate it to Tomas Kuhn‘s (1962) book on normal science and to 
distinguish it from Stephen Toulmin‘s (1985) postmodern science.  
 
Post Normal Science is a quest for the appropriate management of quality in the 
presence of irreducible uncertainty (Knight, 1921); it comprises an awareness of the 
role of values and the acceptance of a plurality of commitments and perspectives. 
These are expressed through an extended peer community, involving many scientific 
disciplines, as well as concerned citizens and a plurality of stakeholders in the tasks of 
problem framing, assessment and quality control.  
 
PNS emerges from the realization that major societal issues involving risk and 
uncertainty are poorly dealt with by Modern science rigidly organized along 
disciplinary lines (see also in this respect chapter 9 in Toulmin, 2001), and under the 
paradigm of ―sound science‖. PNS embraces complexity (including in the set of 
norms and values) and fosters a new system of scientific governance. The purpose is 
to enable a plurality of different though legitimate perspectives to be brought to bear 
on the debate in a reflexive fashion. In this fashion, PNS addresses the so-called type 
III error (Raifa, 1968; Dunn, 1997), which manifests itself when an issue is framed 
with the exclusion of one or more relevant and legitimate constituencies.  
 
3. NUSAP 
 Until recently, the field of uncertainty analysis of simulation models mainly evolved 
around mathematical methods such as error propagation equations and Monte Carlo 
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techniques. These tools address quantitative dimensions of uncertainty. Although 
these quantitative techniques are essential in any uncertainty analysis, they can only 
account for what can be quantified and thus provide only a partial insight in what 
usually is a very complex mass of uncertainties involving technical, methodological, 
epistemological and societal dimensions. In many cases where models are used to 
inform policy making, unquantifiable uncertainties may well dominate the 
quantifiable ones, which implies that these quantitative techniques are of limited value 
for this particular class of problems.  
 
In the school of Post Normal science, several new multidimensional and reflective 
approaches have been developed to systematically address unquantifiable dimensions 
of uncertainty. The most widely known is the NUSAP system for multidimensional 
uncertainty assessment (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; Van der Sluijs et al., 2005). 
NUSAP is a tool and notational system for the analysis and diagnosis of uncertainty in 
science for policy. The basic idea is to qualify quantities - especially those that feed 
into the policy process - by using the five qualifiers of the NUSAP acronym:  
 
 Numeral, the numerical value of the claimed quantity   
 Unit, its units 
 Spread, a measure of (statistical or measurement) error 
 Assessment, an assessment of the reliability of the claim made by experts   
 Pedigree, which conveys an evaluative account of the production process of 
the quantity, and indicates different aspects of its underpinning and scientific 
status.  
 
Pedigree is expressed by means of a set of pedigree criteria to assess these different 
aspects. Each pedigree criterion has a 5-point scoring scale, the criteria and scores are 
defined in a pedigree matrix. The attributes used in Pedigree thus represent a multi 
criteria assessment of the claim and are a function of the type of claim being 
investigated. If the claim is that some quantity (e.g. northern hemisphere mean 
temperature in the year 1300) amounts to some numeral (e.g. 14.1°C), the matrix 
could cover (van der Sluijs, 2005, 2010): 
  
 proxy representation, how close is the primary source of information (e.g. size 
of tree rings) from which the quantity (e.g. temperature in some past year) was 
derived to that quantity;  
 empirical basis, ranging from ‗large sample direct measurement‘ to ‗crude 
speculation‘;  
 methodological rigor, ranging from ‗best available practice‘ to ‗no discernible 
rigour‘;  
 degree of validation, ranging from ‗compared with independent measurements 
of the same variable‘ to ‗no validation‘.  
 
The NUSAP approach is adopted in the Netherlands as part of the Guidance on 
Uncertainty Assessment and Communication of the Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency (Van der Sluijs et al., 2008; Petersen et al., 2011).   
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4. Sensitivity Analysis 
There is a consensus among practitioners from a plurality of disciplines (Kennedy, 
2007; Leamer, 1990; Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis, 2007; Saltelli et al., 2008, 2010; 
Santner et al., 2003; Oakley and O‘Hagan, 2004; Saisana et al., 2005) as well as 
among guidelines devoted to modelling and impact assessment (EC, 2009; EPA, 
2009; OMB, 2006) that sensitivity analysis is an indispensable element to judge the 
quality of  inference based on a mathematical models.    
 
Sensitivity analysis‘ good practices (see a recent review at Saltelli et al., 2005-2012) 
prescribes that the uncertainty in the inference be quantified by a simultaneous 
activation of all possible assumptions‘ uncertainties, followed by an identification of 
those assumptions chiefly responsible for the uncertainty in the inference. Being 
numerical experiments, these analyses should be implemented following a statistical 
design, as one expects for a physical or biological experiment. Assumptions become 
then factors, whose effect is explored using techniques partly derived from 
experimental design, a branch of applied statistics.  
 
EPA 2009 describes well what an ideal sensitivity analysis must do:  
 
[SA] methods should preferably be able to deal with a model regardless of 
assumptions about a model‟s linearity and additivity, consider interaction 
effects among input uncertainties, […], and evaluate the effect of an input 
while all other inputs are allowed to vary as well.    
 
A class of methods which fulfil EPA‘s technical requirements is based on 
decomposing the variance of the inference according to bits which can be attributed to 
either input factors or combination of factors, the so-called interactions (Saltelli et al., 
2008, 2010). This kind of analysis is only successful to the extent that all sources of 
uncertainties have been identified, which is in most cases impossible to prove (see 
Rule 7), and that the model is relevant to issue being analyzed. These vast limitations 
of a technical sensitivity analysis should not justify omitting the analysis of 
performing it in a perfunctory way. As discusses in Saltelli and Annoni (2010), 
notwithstanding existing guidelines, most sensitivity analyses seen in the literature 
tend to display a cavalier attitude with respect to statistical design, model non linearity 
and model non additivity issues (see Rule 7). As noted in The Flaw of Averages 
(Savage, 2009) when one scaffold is made by coupling several stairs, one cannot 
‗shake‘ one stair at a time to test the safety of the scaffold. A better idea of the 
stability of the scaffold is obtained by shaking all stairs simultaneously. The fact that 
books are written to  hammer this self-evident point suggests that not all is clear and 
agreed among practitioners.     
       
5. Sensitivity Auditing 
Sensitivity auditing aims to extend sensitivity analysis to contexts when mathematical 
modelling feeds into a policy context. Sensitivity auditing is thus posed to help 
gauging the quality of scientific information in all cases where models are at play and 
their outcome feeds into the public discourse, be it in the context of a policy 
assessment (ex ante or post), or in the general public arenas where policies are 
contested. Sensitivity auditing starts from the awareness that in an adversarial or 
 5 
media context not only the nature of the evidence, but also the degree of certainty and 
uncertainty associated to the evidence will be the subject of partisan interests. It 
encompasses the ideas of post normal science exposed earlier and its associated 
concept of quality assurance by an extended peer community. An extended peer 
community consists not merely of persons with some form or other of 
institutional accreditation, but rather of all those with a desire to participate in 
extended peer review processes for the resolution of a specific issue. We argue that 
sensitivity auditing implies in practice the implementation of spaces where relevant 
social actors are enabled and invited to scrutinise modelling activities (including their 
policy applications) using their specific knowledge in inclusive and influential ways.  
 
Hence, the set of rules presented in here for sensitivity auditing presupposes that an 
―extended peer community‖ is identified and involved in the sensitivity auditing of 
the mathematical modelling. Useful recipes for sensitivity auditing which are 
proposed here are:    
 
1. Check against rhetoric use of mathematical modelling;    
2. Adopt an ‗assumption hunting‘ attitude;    
3. Detect Garbage In Garbage Out (GIGO), in the extended definition of 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990);  
4. Find sensitive assumptions before these finds you;  
5. Aim for transparency;   
6. Do the right sums;   
7. Focus the analysis on the key question answered by the model, exploring 
holistically the entire space of the assumptions.  
 
Before going into the rules in detail, we would like to motivate the need for 
introducing them with some examples in which modelling used to underpin policy 
appears dysfunctional.  
 
1 The financial crisis and the modelling of collateralized debt obligations.  
This is a quite well known story, and concerns the formula of David X. Li and used in 
the pricing of collateralized debt obligations (the infamous CDO‘s). The story is 
popularized in an article of Wired (Salmon, 2009), where it is told how the toxicity of 
these securities (which packed as many as two thousand individual mortgages into a 
single obligation) was elegantly overlooked by applying a modelling approach 
(Gaussian Copula) whereby the probability of joint default of any couple of individual 
mortgages in the bundle was described by a correlation coefficient estimated on 
historic data. Unfortunately the ‗history‘ on which this parameter was estimated was a 
short one, and only relative to a period of housing market up-swing; thus the 
probability of joint failure of two mortgages was very low in the world of the model. 
The story changed when the housing bubble exploded, whereby Li‘s formula lost any 
predictive power on the world of things. Of course this accident could not have gone 
overlooked by the ‗quants‘, the mathematicians who are employed in the world of 
finance. ‗Anything that relies on correlation is charlatanism‘, noted Nassim N. Taleb 
(cited ibidem). The point of the anecdote is that when important stakes are at play the 
normative stance of all actors – including scientists, must be questioned openly‘ Yet it 
would be unfair fingers the quants as the sole modellers with a responsibility for the 
crisis. As amply debated on the press and in the specialized literature if was the entire 
macro-economic modelling fabric that was found wanting: ―The standard 
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macroeconomic models have failed, by all the most important tests of scientific 
theory. They did not predict that the financial crisis would happen; and when it did, 
they understated its effects” (Stiglitz, 2011). We shall return to the issue in section 6.    
 
2 Dutch overhead powerlines cause 0.5 cases of childleukemia per year, model 
says.  
In 2000, the Health Council of the Netherlands reviewed epidemiological state of 
knowledge on health risks of Extreme Low Frequency Electro Magnetic Field (ELF 
EMF) and concluded that a ‗relatively consistent association between the occurrence 
of childhood leukaemia and living in the vicinity of overhead power lines‘ exists. In 
response, the Ministry asked the Netherlands Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment (RIVM) to quantify what the risk of overhead powerlines for the 
Netherlands population would be if one would assume that the association is causal. 
Making use of estimations on numbers of dwellings in different (magnetic) zones 
close to overhead power lines, (RIVM) translated the relative risks found in 
international pooled analyses into an annual number of extra cases of childhood 
leukaemia (Van der Plas et al, 2001; Pruppers, 2003). Their chain of calculations 
resulted in the claim that overhead power lines add 0.4-0.5 extra cases leukaemia 
annually in NL (to a total of 110 cases per year). To enable the quantification 
requested by the Ministry, RIVM had to make a vast amount of assumptions, both 
prior to and in the model calculation chain. Not all of these were stated explicit in the 
report. De Jong et al (2012) applied the "assumption hunting" approach to deconstruct 
RIVM's model calculation. In a first step, 35 assumptions were identified. In an expert 
workshop that included RIVM experts involved, the list of assumption was reviewed, 
completed, and ranked according to (estimated) ordinal importance with regard to 
influence on the outcome of the calculation. The top 5 is listed in table 1. Next, the 
pedigree of each assumption was assessed. The assumptions with the highest expected 
impact on the number of extra cases of child leukaemia turned out to be also the ones 
with the lowest pedigree: many of these assumptions are difficult to underpin and 
highly value-laden with the state of current knowledge. Moreover, the assumption 
hunting workshop found that the assumptions which are regarded to be most 
problematic are prior to the model calculation chain developed by the RIVM: they are 
hidden in numbers that are taken from other disciplines and fed into the model, such 
as the relative risk factors established in the pooled analysis of epidemiological 
studies. This finding highlights the key importance of a wide extension of the peer 
community engaged in model quality control. 
 
Rank Assumption 
1 A causal relationship exists between exposure to electromagnetic fields of overhead power 
lines and the occurrence of childhood leukaemia 
2 Overhead power lines are the main differentiating source of exposure to electromagnetic 
fields for children 
3 The height of the (prolonged) average of exposure causes the effect 
4 A threshold value exists 
5 The current in the year prior to determining the incidence of childhood leukaemia is 
representative for the average current during the development of childhood leukaemia 
Table 1: top 5 of assumptions in overhead powerlines health risk study (De Jong et al, 2012) 
 
 
3  AIDS 
In their book ―Useless Mathematics‖, Pilkey & Pilkey (2007) describe many instances 
of dysfunctional policy advice supported by mathematical modelling. We have 
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borrowed this story from their account. Mathematical models can be used to boost 
causes both bad and good. A troublesome example of good cause modelling is the 
prediction and monitoring of the spread of HIV AIDS around the world, especially in 
Africa where the disease is taking its worst toll. UNAIDS takes the responsibility for 
tracking the disease, which it does in large part through the use of mathematical 
models. UNAIDS claims 30 M Africans suffer from the disease. In 2003, a South 
African activist reported in an article Sunday Telegraph that the UN models may have 
distorted the extent of epidemics in Africa. Quantitative mathematical models are 
universally used to keep track of and to predict the future courses of diseases but of 
course models require extensive ground truthing or field checking. In most of 
southern Africa, record keeping is poor to non-existing, and except for South Africa 
there is simply no dependable real world information. 250,000 would die in 1999 
according to Epi Model (an epidemiological model, Chin and Lwanga 1991). But that 
year 375000 died of all causes. The number of AIDS victims is far too large a 
proportion, 2/3 of the total deaths.  
 
Another model predicted 143,000 deaths of AIDS. In 2001, the much advanced ASSA 
2,000 model predicted that there must have been 92,000 AIDS deaths. There are real 
difficulties in determining AIDS death rates because the weakened immune system 
can result in death from a number of causes.  
 
But the experience in South Africa suggests that the AIDS disaster might not be as 
advanced as previously assumed by the UN, certainly this is a point worth considering 
because research on other more ravaging diseases in Africa such as Malaria is said to 
be under-funded because of the anticipated AIDS calamity. (900 000 deaths for 
Malaria occur every year in sub-Saharan Africa, 70% being children of less than 5 Y). 
So, where did the numbers come from? There is a genuine lack of records. The 
models have a poor database.  
 
The possibility that a true global disaster is just around the corner unfortunately 
provides an unparalleled opportunity for the modelling that checks-up the numbers to 
draw attention and funding. Failure to make a simple reality check allowed the results 
to become accepted ―facts‖.  
 
6. Rules for Sensitivity Auditing 
 
 
Rule 1: Check against rhetoric use of mathematical modelling 
 
As noted by Hornberger and Spear (1981) 
 
[…] most simulation models will be complex, with many parameters, state-
variables and non linear relations. Under the best circumstances, such models 
have many degrees of freedom and, with judicious fiddling, can be made to 
produce virtually any desired behaviour, often with both plausible structure 
and parameter values. 
 
This sober view of modelling was popularized by novelist Douglas Adam in one of 
his classic novels (1987):  
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Well, Gordon‟s great insight was to design a program which allowed you to 
specify in advance what decision you wished it to reach, and only then to give 
it all the facts. The program‟s task, […], was to construct a plausible series of 
logical-sounding steps to connect the premises with the conclusion. 
  
Adam‘s irony is cogent. Mathematical modelling is an apt tool to transform evidence 
based policy in its reverse. The abundance of parameter and assumptions makes the 
task of mapping the facts to the desired inference trivially easy. This does not apply 
only to the over-parameterized models addressed by Hornberger and Spear (1981), 
but also to the relatively parsimonious models used in applied econometrics, as 
vividly illustrated by Edward E. Leamer (2010).      
 
This use of mathematical modelling (a technique, a language) in a scantly disguised 
normative (or advocacy) mode can be termed rhetoric, or strategic (Boulangeret al., 
2007), like the use of Latin by the elites or the clergy throughout the classic age, in 
situations where the purpose was to confuse or obfuscate rather than to communicate
1
.         
 
There is a vast literature sounding the alarm on instances of corruptions in the use of 
mathematical models, with the earliest warnings coming by Saunders Mac Lane 
(1988a,b) in a exchange on letters on the journal SCIENCE on the subject of system 
analysis as practiced at International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA):  
 
[…] this type of "systems analysis" consists of the construction of massive 
imaginary future "scenarios" with elaborate equations for quantitative 
"models" which combine to provide predictions or projections […] which 
cannot be verified by checking against objective facts. Instead IIASA studies 
often proceed by combining in series a number of such unverified models, 
feeding the output of one such model as input into another equally unverified 
model.  
 
The mediatic aspect of the issue is investigated by philosopher Jean Baudrillard 
(Baudrillard, 1999), according to whom modelling, when used outside ‗controlled 
scientific conditions‟ but ‗in mass communication, […] assumes the force of reality, 
abolishing and volatilizing the latter  in favour of that neo-reality of a model 
materialized by the medium itself.”   
 
Along similar lines one of the authors (JvdS, 1998) observed that ‗Once 
environmental numbers are thrown over the disciplinary fence, important caveats 
tend to be ignored, uncertainties compressed and numbers used at face value‘.  
 
Other recent contributions to the topic are the book of Orrin H. Pilkey  and  Linda 
Pilkey-Jarvis (Useless Arithmetic: Why Environmental Scientists Can't Predict the 
Future), whose title is eloquent enough, and the successful volume of Nassim Nichola 
Taleb (The Black Swan, 2007), where issue is taken against modelers‘ attempt to 
Platonify reality, meaning by this the man‘s attempt to stick to elegant formal 
structures to describe facts which are too stubborn to be subdued by such 
                                                 
1 An illustration is in Alessandro Manzoni‘s The Betrothed: ‗What do you expect me to make of your 
latinorum? (Che vuol ch'io faccia del suo latinorum)‘, is the retort of Renzo, one of the characters in 
the novel, to the rector of his parish who tries to confuse him with Latin.     
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simplifications. Taleb‘s call reminds of Stephen Toulmin‘s (2001) plea for 
reasonableness as opposed to overstretched rationality.   
   
Apparently one is never vigilant enough, as --in spite of the warnings cited, many 
have unfortunately a posteriori seen the links between the 2008 credit crunch and the 
mathematical models disingenuously used to price the financial products at the heart 
of the crisis. According to Leamer (2010), ‗With the ashes of the mathematical models 
used to rate mortgage-backed securities still smoldering on Wall Street, now is an 
ideal time to revisit the sensitivity issues‘, which incidentally is also the scope of the 
present work. For Paul Krugman (2010), in a chapter aptly named ‗Complexity – 
going beyond transparency‘ notes: ‗[…] Part of the agenda of computer models was 
to maximize the fraction of, say, a lousy sub-prime mortgage that could get an AAA 
rating, then an AA rating, and so forth, […]‘, p. 161, thereby linking ‗Perverse 
incentives‘ to ‗flawed models‘, p.92. Finally Jerry Ravetz (2010), in discussing the 
ethics of scientists, muses ‗Yet we now know that the collective endeavour of these 
[…] very nice entrepreneurial scientists [the ‗quants‘, mathematicians employed in 
finance] has resulted in the creation of a mountain of toxic fake securities‘.   
 
In summary, Rule 1 prescribes that the prospective sensitivity auditor maintains open 
eyes and ‗organized scepticism‘ toward technical and normative hurdles limiting the 
plausibility of a model based inference.    
 
 
Rule 2: Adopt an ‘assumption hunting’ attitude. 
 
Models are full of more or less explicit assumptions, which - once made explicit, pose 
varying challenges to the belief of the beholder. These assumptions may have 
sedimented into the interstices of a model, or they may have been pondered in the pre-
analytic phase of the model and henceforth forgotten by the same users of the model. 
As an example, in Laes et al., 2011 one notes that in relation to the ‗[…] calculation 
of the external costs of a potential large-scale nuclear accident […]  [an analysis] 
resulted in a list of 30 calculation steps and assumptions‘.  
 
Kloprogge et al. (2011) suggest to structure the evaluation of a model based inference 
into a series of steps covering analysis, revision and communication. The analysis 
focus on identifying explicit and implicit assumptions in the calculation 
chain and the potential value-ladennes of key assumptions. The revision includes a 
sensitivity analysis and a possible diversification of the assumption, while 
communication aims to make explicit the entire process, inclusive of element of value 
ladennes and possible alternatives. The degree of value ladennes is estimated via the 
use of pedigree matrices following the NUSAP methodologies (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1990). The revision phase combines information from the pedigree analysis 
and the sensitivity analysis. Those assumptions with a weak pedigree and a strong 
sensitivity on the inference are those which deserve more scrutiny, revision, and 
which are at the top of the communication effort. 
 
In the work of Laes et. al. (2011) already cited the communication phase led to a 
substantial rejection by stakeholders of the model as a relevant tool for policy, as the 
model‘s assumptions were judged either implausible or contentious.     
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An application of these approaches to microbial contamination risk analysis is Boone 
et al. (2010), while the case of electromagnetic fields is investigated in de Jong et al. 
(2012).     
 
Just to dispel the impression that assumptions-related scruples are the preserve of a 
restricted circle of practitioners, one can read on the Financial Times (2011) 
economist John Kay elaborating on the ‗making up‘ of the missing data needed to 
operate models:  
 
You assume the future will be like the past, or you extrapolate a trend. 
Whatever you do, no cell on the spreadsheet may be left unfilled. If necessary, 
you put a finger in the air. This may lead to extravagant flights of fantasy. To 
use Britain‟s Department of Transport scheme for assessing projects, you 
have to impute values of time in 13 different activities, not just today, but in 
2053. […] What will be average car occupancy rates, differentiated by time of 
day, in 2035?     
 
The future being unlike the past (and this being the source of many explicit or implicit 
assumptions) is an old problem. In the words of Frank Knight (1921):  
 
We live in a world of contradiction and paradox, a fact of which perhaps the 
most fundamental illustration is this: that the existence of a problem of 
knowledge depends on the future being different from the past, while the 
possibility of the solution of the problem depends on the future being like the 
past.    
 
Rule 3: Detect garbage in garbage out (GIGO) 
 
Garbage in garbage out, or GIGO, is the instrumental minimization of uncertainty 
operated to inflate certainty in the inference, as defined both by econometricians 
(Edward Leamer, Peter Kennedy) and epistemologists (Silvio Funtowicz and Jerry 
Ravetz). According to the latters GIGO-science – or pseudo-science, is ‗where 
uncertainties in inputs must be suppressed lest outputs become indeterminate‘. This 
implies artificially deflating the uncertainty in the assumptions to avoid that the 
distribution of the inference becomes so flat as to be useless. Saltelli and d‘Hombres 
(2011) use sensitivity auditing to argue that this is the case for the cost benefit 
analysis proposed by various parties in relation to climate change action or inaction. A 
very similar standpoint – only turned in an affirmative/positive version, is from 
Leamer 1990 work, where he states:  
 
I have proposed a form of organised sensitivity analysis that I call “global 
sensitivity analysis” in which a neighborhood of alternative assumptions is 
selected and the corresponding interval of inferences is identified.  
Conclusions are judged to be sturdy only if the neighborhood of assumptions 
is wide enough to be credible and the corresponding interval of inferences is 
narrow enough to be useful. 
 
This is after all not a new idea. A related trade-off is in Imre Lakatos (1976, p.57): 
‗when increasing certainty, you decrease content‘, meaning by this that the more one 
makes a theorem refutation proof, the more the theorem‘s range of application 
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empties. Leamer‘s viewpoint is upheld in standard econometrics textbooks; see e.g. 
Kennedy (2007, see Rule 4).  
 
In a policy context uncertainty can be amplified as well minimized according to 
convenience. Oreskes and Conway (2010) describe a famous case of uncertainty 
amplification for  tobacco‘s health effect. These author compare the the narrative of 
the tobacco companies fighting to deny the health effect of smoking to to those of 
climate sceptics who – according to these authors – amplified uncertainty about 
anthropogenic climate change. Naomi Oreskes is well known to modellers for having 
extensively written against the concept of model validation or verification. According 
to Oreskes, models can be evaluated, or corroborated, but never be proven true 
(1994).  
 
In a later work Oreskes (2000) articulated her critique by noting that  
 
models are complex amalgam of theoretical and phenomenological laws (and 
the governing equations and algorithms that represent them), empirical input 
parameters, and a model conceptualization. When a model generates a 
prediction, of what precisely is the prediction a test? The laws? The input 
data? The conceptualization? Any part (or several parts) of the model might 
be in error, and there is no simple way to determine which one it is. 
 
Oreskes‘s point is linked to the parallel often made between a logical proposition – a 
theory-based statement - and a model prediction. Although models share the scientific 
flavour of postulated laws or theories they are not laws in that the making of a model 
is substantially more fraught with assumptions than crisp theories or agile laws 
ordinarily are. She notes ‗[…] to be of value in theory testing, the predictions involved 
must be capable of refuting the theory that generated them.‘ What when the ‗theory‘ 
is not a law but a mathematical model? ‗This is where predictions […] become 
particularly sticky.‘ The crux of the matter is that model based inferences are very 
delicate artefacts. 
  
Another interesting story about uncertainty manipulation is that told by David 
Michaels – a former EPA employee, on the battles between industry and regulators 
over the US data quality act and the standard for exposure to beryllium. This is where 
industry fought hard to amplify uncertainty, according to the author, as to prevent 
regulators from imposing more stringent standards. The same debate in the US 
surrounded the Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin (January 9, 2006, see  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/, which was received by some as an attempt 
‗to bog the [regulatory] process down, in the name of transparency‟  (Robert Shull 
cited in Macilwain, 2006). In the same article one reads ‗ […]  the proposed bulletin 
resembles several earlier efforts, including rules on 'information quality' and 
requirements for cost–benefit analyses, that make use of the OMB's [Office for 
Management and Budget] extensive powers to weaken all forms of regulation.‘ 
  
An important consequence of Rule 3 is that one should particularly severe against 
spurious accuracy, e.g. when a result is given with a number of digits exceeding (at 
time ludicrously) a plausible estimate of the associated uncertainty.           
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Rule 4: Find sensitive assumptions before these finds you 
 
One of the ten commandments of applied econometrics according to Peter Kennedy  
popular Econometrics textbook on Applied Econometrics is: ‗Thou shall confess in 
the presence of sensitivity. Corollary: Thou shall anticipate criticism.‘ This wisdom 
of this principle is evident, in that when an unwanted or unexpected model sensitivity 
is exposed by a third party, it becomes arduous for the proponent modellers to 
reinstate a just-falsified inference. Thus sensitivity analysis, or better sensitivity 
auditing, can be used to anticipate a critique. This is the application to modelling of 
Robert K. Merton ‗organized scepticism‘. According to Merton Communalism, 
Universalism, Disinterestedness and Organized Skepticism are the operating 
principles (norms) of the scientific method. Also for Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis (2007) 
‗Scientific mathematical modelling should involve constant efforts to falsify the 
model‘.   
 
 
Rule 5: Aim to for transparency. 
 
The discussion of Rule 3 above about the data quality act and the risk assessment 
bulletin has shown how the issue the issue of transparency can be the subject of 
dispute. While transparency can in general be seen as an element of quality, it can at 
times be denounced as pretext to ‗bog the process down‘. While keeping this caveat in 
mind, we shall mostly embrace transparency as useful in the context of mathematical 
modelling when this has to feed into the policy process.  
 
According to the OMB (2002) models should be made available to a third party so 
that it can ‗use the same data, computer model or statistical methods to replicate the 
analytic results reported in the original study. […] The more important benefit of 
transparency is that the public will be able to assess how much an agency‟s analytic 
result hinges on the specific analytic choices made by the agency.‟ 
 
The OMB suggestion hence is that reproducibility is an necessary condition to 
transparency. Our suggestion is that transparency is in turn useful to defend the 
legitimacy and epistemic authority of the institutions making use of mathematical 
modelling in the context of a policy assessment.     
 
Often the same model used within an organization to paddle through the analysis, the 
workhorse pulling the cart of the daily ‗what if‘, ‗caeteris paribus‘ work, might be 
used in an adversarial context, simply because it is expected that external stakeholder 
will accept the house‘s wisdom and its model. This may well be the case, but one 
would be wise not to bank on it. The problem is that in real life caeteris are never 
paribus.  
 
In the words of Joseph Stiglitz: ―Models by their nature are like blinders. In leaving 
out certain things, they focus our attention on other things. They provide a frame 
through which we see the world.‖ (2011) 
 
A considerable amount of work is needed to transform the workhorse (the frame 
through which we see the world) into something more agile and proportionate that can 
stand in court. Real life examples show that model use may even become counter 
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productive in a policy debate when this type of simplification is not operated. In the 
context of climate this point is made by Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis (2007, chapter 4), 
where it is argued that the climate-sceptics‘ work would be harder if […] the global 
change modeling community would firmly and publicly recognize that its efforts to 
truly quantify the future are an academic exercise and that existing  field data on  
atmospheric temperatures, melting glaciers, […] and other evidence should be relied 
on to a much greater degree to convince politicians that we have a problem. Let the 
models point to a trend and answer „what-if‟ questions. A serious societal debate 
about „solutions‟ can never occur as long as modellers hold out the probability, just 
around the corner, of accurate projections of future climates and seal-level position.     
 
Five years after the publication of this book we see comforting signs that the point has 
been driven home; it is now admitted that the more one understands climate, the more 
model predictions may become uncertain (Maslin and Austin, 2012), and more and 
more means and standard deviations (e.g. of temperature) populate the discourse on 
climate (Hansen, et al., 2012). Still policy makers associate a 50% certainty to 
meeting a 2 degree centigrade temperature increase, a climate policy target, with a 
greenhouse gas concentrations at 450 ppm CO2-equivalent (Meinshausen et al., 
2005
2
). Given that these three numbers (0.5, 450, 2) are model-generated some more 
circumspection would befit the prospective sensitivity auditor.  
 
Finally one had to admit that at present there is in general little scientific incentive to 
reproduce a model. This has been observed in scientific papers (recently in Nature 
[reference]): nobody tries to reproduce the results because it takes resources that are 
never justified. The only arena in which it is done is in an already contested and 
controversial issue and where the stakes are no longer in the context of ‗normal‘ 
science but in the context of use. 
 
 
Rule 6: Do the right sums   
 
In ‗Return to Reason‘ Stephen Toulmin vividly recalls the dangers of precision: 
‗Doing the sum right‘ is a far lesser challenge than ‗Doing the right sums‘.  
In modelling as in life framing error, or Type 3 errors, are the most dangerous. When 
performing an uncertainty and sensitivity analysis one falls easily into that which N. 
Taleb (2007) calls ‗The delusion of uncertainty‘ and which is known in Dutch as 
‗Lampposting‘, whereby ‗The uncertainties which are more carefully scrutinised are 
usually those which are the least relevant, (van der Sluijs, reference missing).  
Lampposting refers to the joke of the drunkard looking for his lost keys not in his 
house‘s garden, where he lost them, but in the street under a lamp as ‗there is more 
light‘.  
   
A type three error is illustrated in the work of Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis already cited, 
The examples concerns the Yucca Mountain repository for radioactive waste. A 
model named TSPA (for total system performance assessment) has been used for the 
safety analysis computations. TSPA is Composed of 286 sub-models. A key 
assumption in TSPA is the range of permitted values for the permeability of the 
                                                 
2 http://www.pik-
potsdam.de/~mmalte/simcap/publications/meinshausenm_risk_of_overshooting_final_webversion.pdf 
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geological formation. A low permeability is key to ensure that water will take a long 
time to percolate from surface to disposal. For the Yucca mountain test disposal site a 
range of 0.02 to 1 millimetre per year was used for the percolation rate.  The 
confidence of the stakeholders in TSPA was not helped when evidence was produced 
which led to an upward revision of 4 orders of magnitude of this parameter (order of 
three metres per year). The evidence in question was the presence at the repository 
level of an isotope of chlorine 
36
Cl associated to atomic bombs detonations in the 
atmosphere. According to the authors the error was due to the modelling of the granite 
formation as a homogeneous medium, while a fissures and faults model of the same 
formation would have been more realistic.   
Sensitivity analysis is no immune to type three errors, and neither is sensitivity 
auditing (Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis, 2007):  
 
„It is important […] to recognize that the sensitivity of the parameter in the 
equation is what is being determined, not the sensitivity of the parameter in 
nature. […] If the model is wrong or if it is a poor representation of reality, 
determining the sensitivity of an individual parameter in the model is a 
meaningless pursuit‟   
 
Type three error which are most common are likely those associated to neglecting part 
of the views and expectations surrounding the issue at stake.  
 
 
Rule 7: Focus the analysis  
 
Sensitivity is often omitted in modelling studies, or it is executed in a perfunctory 
fashion. According to Leamer (1010) ‗One reason these methods [global sensitivity 
analysis] are rarely used is their honesty seems destructive‘. Most sensitivity analysis 
seen in the highest ranking journals such SCIENCE and Nature are perfunctory. The 
may sound a surprising claim. Still the analyses of sensitivity reviewed in Saltelli and 
Annoni (2010) were run without a statistical design, moving just one input factor at a 
time. Beside neglecting the existence if interactions among factors, this approach 
bumps against the curse of dimensionality, as at already moderate dimensionality 
moving one factor at a time explores only a tiny fraction of the space of the input.  
 
In general a sensitivity analysis performed without a statistical design and without an 
estimate of the error is poor. In the context of modelling studies used in support to 
policy sensitivity analysis should also be parsimonious and possible cogent, i.e. it 
should focus on a single target variable, being this the relevant inference that the 
modelling study is trying to underpin. The analysis should be one and not many, 
covering to the entire evidential chain, as opposed to covering one sub-model at a 
time. Again this is needed to ensure that all interactions among factors in different 
compartments are being captured. Following this view, rather than diluting the 
sensitivity analysis showing its results for different scenarios, the scenario should be 
one of the variables activated in the frame of a single analysis.  
 
An illustration of Rule 7 to the sensitivity analysis performed in the context of the 
Stern Review is in Saltelli and d‘Hombres (2012). In this paper one criticises both the 
authors of the Stern review and their opponents for lacking a rigorous design-based 
sensitivity analysis and for using highly uncertain numbers (e.g. discount rates) at face 
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value extending the scope of a cost benefit analysis to cover two centuries from 
present time, thus appearing to use mathematical models expediently, for the sake of 
projecting pre-established normative stances.      
 
As argued earlier, the process by which sensitivity auditing is carried out should be 
consistent with the ideas of post-normal science embraced in here. So, a participatory 
process where relevant members of the extended community of peers are first 
identified and subsequently involved in this process needs to be organised. The 
identification of this community can be done in many ways, the most obvious being 
through institutional analysis and stakeholder analysis. The spaces where such 
scrutiny occurs can be a myriad according to the communities involved. Such spaces, 
safe and authorised (Guimarães Pereira et al. 2010) take the vest of ―focus groups‖, 
―juries‖, consensus workshops, or merely in-depth interviews with specific 
individuals. It is obvious that the less specialised is the community involved the better 
the unfolding of the modelling ―black boxes‖ has to be prepared. We argue that 
―progressive disclosure of information‖ (Guimarães Pereira et al. 2006) is a key 
principle of design of communication in participatory settings due to the support it 
provides for mixed expertises. Information is supplied in layers of increasing 
specialisation, depending on actors‘ interests and necessary specialised information. 
So, in other words on a process of auditing such as the one suggested, the modelling 
―black box‖ needs to be progressively and intelligibly open to those who participate in 
the exercise. The community involved, the space and the fairness with which the 
object of scrutiny is looked at gives the legitimacy to the whole exercise. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Throughout this paper we have discussed of mathematical modelling in general, 
without distinguishing between data driven and principle driven models, between 
micro and macro, between natural sciences and social sciences styles of modelling. It 
is clear that the arguments developed in this paper are general to forms of evidence 
that demand statistical, mathematical or otherwise disciplinary elaboration. We wold 
hence prescribe similar recipes when the model is in fact a statistical indicator, whose 
construction customarily demands several modelling steps (Boulanger et al, 2007, 
Paruolo et al., 2012).          
 
Since no recipe is universal, many words of caution should be added to our list of 
prescriptions, however sensible these may appear to a benevolent reader. In a value-
laden context the correctness of the prescriptions may well be a casualty in the power 
game, as the first casualty of a battle is the battle plan.    
 
Indeed the quality of the rules can only be judged in relation to their fitness for an 
assigned purpose in a specified case, and there is no guarantee that major blunders 
will be avoided by a diligent application. The rules are a minimum, due-diligence 
requirement for the use of model based inference in a policy discourse, and there 
seem to be little justification, given the stakes involved in any policy, in omitting 
these simple well meaning steps. At the very least, sensitivity auditing will ensure that 
the recipients of the analysis are fully aware of the conditionality of the predictions, 
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and a notch more sceptical of model-based evidence when this is presented on the 
basis of an authority principle.  
 
It is possible that the practitioners‘ community is becoming more sympathetic with 
the ‗uncertainty exploration‘ concerns raised in the present work, even in hotly 
debated areas such as climate. ―Many of those of us who spend our working hours, 
and other hours, thinking about uncertainty, strongly believe the climate modelling 
community must not put resolution and processes (to improve the simulator) above 
generating multiple predictions (to improve our estimates of how wrong the simulator 
is).‖ Our optimism rest nevertheless tempered by the fact that the quote just offered 
originates from a blog (allmodelsarewrong.com, Edwards 2012) whose title puts it 
squarely in the field of sympathizers to sensitivity auditing.  
 
PNS likewise promotes awareness of   the ‗danger that public policy could itself 
become the captive of a scientific-technological elite‟ (Eisenhower, 1961).  
 
Link to plausibility  
Why is this relevant for plausibility? 
Could the result of this auditing be express with ideas of plausibility?  
– the applause of many; so a shared agreement for example on rhetoric, 
assumptions; what numbers to use, what sums to carry out, etc. 
– Plausibility after all maps onto fitness for purpose.  
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